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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3) (j) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303(1) (a) : 
[A] policy of motor vehicle liability 
insurance... shall: 
• * * 
(ii)(A), . .if it is an owner's policy, 
...insure the person named in the policy... 
against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles 
within the United States and Canada, subject 
to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for 
each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than 
the minimum limits specified under §31A-22-
304; 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-304: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability 
coverage may not limit the insurer's liability 
under that coverage below the following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability 
for bodily injury to or death of one 
person, arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one 
person in Subsection (a), in the amount 
of $50,000 because of liability for 
bodily injury to or death of two or more 
persons arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; and 
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(c) in the amount of $15,000 
because of liability for injury to, or 
destruction of, property of others 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle 
in any one accident; or 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether 
arising from bodily injury to or the death of 
others, or from destruction of, or damage to, 
the property of others. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, a member of Farmers Insurance 
Group (Farmers) issued a policy of automobile liability insurance 
to Mr. Don Versaw. That policy provided coverage to him for any 
liability up to the limit of the policy. (R. 2, 6). 
Mr. Versaw was in an automobile accident with Mrs. Viera. (R. 
2, 6) . She sued him for her bodily injuries. (R. 161) . Mr. Viera, 
who was not in Mrs. Viera7 s automobile at the time of the accident 
and who, therefore, received no bodily injuries, sued for his loss 
of consortium because of the bodily injuries to his wife. (R. 160, 
161) . 
Farmers offered Mr. and Mrs. Viera a total of $30,000.00 to 
settle both of their claims against Mr. Versaw. (R. 161) . This 
amount represented the policy limit for bodily injury to one 
person. (R. 161). The policy provided that a loss of consortium 
claim was included in the one person limit. (R. 28; see also 
Addendum to Brief of Don Versaw, Exhibit "A"). 
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The offer was rejected. (R. 161) . Farmers filed a Declaratory 
Relief Action to establish its obligations under the policy. (R. 
161) . The trial court ruled in favor of Farmers that the 
$30,000.00 limit for bodily injury to one person applied. (R. 240) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Farmers agrees with Appellants that the bodily injury claim of 
Mrs. Viera is separate and distinct from the loss of consortium 
claim of Mr. Viera, which is a claim for injury to the marriage 
relationship. However, contrary to the assertions of Appellants, 
the Farmers policy of automobile liability insurance issued to Mr. 
Versaw does in fact provide him coverage for liability for Mr. 
Viera's loss of consortium claim. It also clearly and 
unambiguously provides that Mr. Viera7 s loss of consortium claim is 
included in the one person bodily injury limit. The policy issued 
to Mr. Versaw provides him with automobile liability coverage that 
exceeds the minimum limits for bodily injury per person and 
complies with the Utah Insurance Code. '. [$-tkH" -fM^ /^^- A- 1 «r 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
A SPOUSE'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, WHICH 
IS A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CLAIM FROM THE OTHER 
SPOUSE'S BODILY INJURY CLAIM, IS COVERED BY 
THE FARMERS POLICY ISSUED TO MR. VERSAW 
This Court has described a loss of consortium claim as 
follows: 
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Loss of consortium claims are based on the 
recognition of a legally protected interest in 
personal relationships. Accordingly, if one 
member of the relationship is tortiously 
injured the non-injured party has a cause of 
action to recover for their relational 
interest, i.e., the loss of the injured 
party's "company, society, cooperation, (and) 
affection". 
Boucher v. Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1992) 
(citations omitted) 
A loss of consortium claim is derived from the bodily injury 
claim of the spouse of the person making the loss of consortium 
claim. It is not a bodily injury claim itself. It is a claim for 
loss of relationship. Utah's legislature created a statutory loss 
of consortium claim in §30-2-11, Utah Code Annotated. Farmers 
agrees with Appellants that Utah's loss of consortium statute makes 
plain that one spouse's loss of consortium claim is separate and 
distinct from the other spouse's bodily injury claim. The loss of 
consortium claim is a direct claim available to the non-injured 
spouse. It is derivative by statute in the sense that it arises 
from the personal injury claim and is dependent upon the existence 
of the personal injury claim. 
The Farmers policy of automobile liability insurance issued to 
Mr. Versaw must insure him against loss from liability imposed by 
law, including liability pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium 
statute. 
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Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(ii)(A) requires: 
[A] policy of motor vehicle liability 
insurance... shall: 
• * * 
(ii)(A)...if it is an owner's policy, 
...insure the person named in the policy... 
against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles 
within the United States and Canada, subject 
to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for 
each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than 
the minimum limits specified under §31A-22-
304; 
(Emphasis added). 
The required minimum limits are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-22-304: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability 
coverage may not limit the insurer's liability 
under that coverage below the following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability 
for bodily injury to or death of one 
person, arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one 
person in Subsection (a), in the amount 
of $50,000 because of liability for 
bodily injury to or death of two or more 
persons arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $15,000 
because of liability for injury to, or 
destruction of, property of others 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle 
in any one accident; or 
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(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether 
arising from bodily injury to or the death of 
others, or from destruction of, or damage to, 
the property of others. 
The Farmers policy at issue does provide coverage to Mr. 
Versaw against loss from the liability imposed by law as required 
by S31A-22-303 (1) (a) (ii) (A) . Specifically, it provides coverage to 
Mr. Versaw for the loss of consortium that is alleged to have been 
suffered by Arthur Viera as a result of his wife's bodily injuries 
suffered in her automobile collision with Mr. Versaw. The Farmers 
policy expressly covers loss of consortium and provides in relevant 
part at page 6 as follows: 
Limits of Liability 
* * * 
The bodily injury liability limit for "each 
person" is the maximum for bodily injury 
sustained by one person in any occurrence. 
Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to 
the relationship arising from this injury will 
be included in this limit. 
If the financial responsibility law of the 
place of the accident treats the loss of 
consortium as a separate claim, financial 
responsibility limits will be furnished. 
* * * 
(See R. 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A; emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, Farmers policy of automobile liability insurance issued to 
Mr. Versaw covers him for loss of consortium claims. 
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The policy does not necessarily cover Mr. Versaw for the 
entire amount of damages occasioned by such loss of consortium 
claims any more than it necessarily covers him for the entire 
amount of damages from bodily injury claims. Mr. Versaw paid a 
premium for a certain amount of liability coverage. That amount, 
$30,000 per person and $60,000 per occurrence, exceeded the minimum 
limits required by Utah's Insurance Code, which is $25,000 per 
person and $50,000 per occurrence. Section 31A-22-304, Utah Code 
Annotated. That the claims of the Vieras may exceed these limits 
is not relevant to the sole issue before this Court. That issue is 
whether the Farmers policy provided to Mr. Versaw complies with 
Utah law and plainly limits the loss of consortium claim to a one 
person limit. 
It should be noted that the reference to "the financial 
responsibility law" in the "Limits of Liability" portion of the 
Farmers policy quoted above potentially broadens coverage to Mr. 
Versaw if Utah does, in fact, in its Financial Responsibility law 
require separate limits for bodily injury and loss of consortium. 
As more fully argued below, Utah's financial responsibility law 
does not require separate limits. Further, the Farmers policy 
informed Mr. Versaw that loss of consortium was included in the one 
person limit. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Viera may well have claims for her bodily injury 
and his loss of consortium that exceed the insurance proceeds that 
Mr. Versaw bought when he contracted with Farmers for automobile 
liability coverage to meet the minimum requirements of Utah's 
financial responsibility law. Neither Mrs. Viera nor Mr. Viera are 
limited in their rights of recovery against Mr. Versaw because of 
his contract of insurance with Farmers. Therefore, Appellants' 
reference to the Utah's Married Woman's Act is misplaced. That Act 
is not relevant here. Farmers agrees with Mrs. Viera (brief at p. 
11) that "...regardless of her marital status, Mrs. Viera can 
recover against Mr. Versaw for the injuries she suffered." 
Farmers' contract with Mr. Versaw does not "penalize" Mrs. Viera 
for being married. It provides Mr. Versaw with indemnity up to a 
certain limit for the claims against him by Mr. and Mrs. Viera. 
The issue of the rights of Mr. and Mrs. Viera to recover for 
their provable damages against Mr. Versaw should not be confused 
with the issue of what coverage Mr. Versaw has through his contract 
of insurance with Farmers. The former issue relates to the Vieras' 
rights of recovery against Mr. Versaw if he is found to be liable 
to them. By virtue of the Married Woman's Act, Mrs. Viera has the 
individual and personal right to recovery from Mr. Versaw. The 
contract between Farmers and Mr. Versaw is unrelated to the rights 
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of Mrs. Viera guaranteed by the Married Woman's Act and does not 
adversely impact those rights. 
II 
THE FARMERS POLICY CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY 
PROVIDES THAT A LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM IS 
INCLUDED IN THE ONE PERSON LIMIT OF COVERAGE 
When interpreting a contract, this Court looks to the language 
of the contract. If the language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous on its face, the contract is enforced according to its 
terms. A contract of liability insurance is similarly interpreted 
and enforced. Ambiguity is not created because one party to the 
contract interprets contract language differently than another 
party. Otherwise, ambiguity could be created in every case by a 
party contesting disfavored language in the contract. As the Court 
stated in Gee v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 919, 921 
(Utah App. 1992): 
Contract language may be ambiguous if it is 
unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to 
express the intention of the parties may be 
understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings....However, a policy term is not 
ambiguous simply because one of the parties 
ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his 
or her own interests... .Furthermore, if we 
determine that the policy terms are clear and 
unambiguous, "we interpret those terms in 
accordance with their plain and ordinary 
meaning...." 
(citations omitted). 
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The test to be applied in determining whether there is 
ambiguity was set forth more recently by this Court in LPS Hospital 
v. Capital Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1998) : 
Would the meaning (of the language of the 
insurance contract) be plain to a person of 
ordinary intelligence and understanding, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural meaning 
of the words, and in the light of existing 
circumstances, including the purpose of the 
policy. 
Using the same standards of analysis described above, courts 
in surrounding states have interpreted the Farmers Insurance policy 
now in question before this Court. The Farmers policy has been 
found to provide clearly and unambiguously only a one person limit 
for both bodily injury and loss of consortium by courts in 
California, New Mexico, Arizona, Kansas, Wyoming, and Montana. 
The California Court of Appeals in Mid Century Insurance Co. 
v. Bash, 211 Cal. App. 3d 431, 259 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1989), 
interpreted the same Farmers language at issue before this Court 
and held that the policy issued by Mid Century Insurance Company (a 
member of Farmers Insurance Group) unambiguously provided only one 
limit of coverage for both the bodily injury and the loss of 
consortium claims, unless the financial responsibility law of the 
state treated loss of consortium as a separate claim. The court 
found that the California "Financial Responsibility Law" referred 
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to a specific body of law which had no such requirement for 
separate limits: 
The sole legal issue presented is whether Mid-
Century' s policy provides separate coverage 
under the "per occurrence" limits of liability 
for damages for loss of consortium claimed by 
wife, following a settlement of "per person" 
limits with her husband. 
We hold the above policy provisions to be 
unambiguous, clearly including any loss of 
consortium claim in the "each person" 
liability limits for injury to any one person 
in any occurrence. We further find that the 
phrase "financial responsibility law" clearly 
refers to a specific body of statutory law, 
and that under the California Financial 
Responsibility Law there is no requirement 
that separate limits be provided for loss-of-
consortium claims. 
Id. at 434. 
Likewise, Utah's Financial Responsibility Law is a specific body of 
law, which has no requirement for separate limits. Nothing in 
either Utah's Financial Responsibility Law nor in its Insurance 
Code requires separate limits for bodily injury and loss of 
consortium. 
In Nollen v. Reynolds, 962 P.2d 633 (N.M. 1998) the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals interpreted the relevant Farmers Insurance policy 
language at issue in the present case: 
1. the bodily injury liability limit for 'each 
person' is the maximum for bodily injury 
sustained by one person in any occurrence. 
Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to 
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the relationship arising from this injury 
shall be included in this limit. 
* * * 
962 P.2d at 634. 
The New Mexico Court said: 
The policy language in Paragraph 1 was drafted 
to ensure that loss-of-consortium damages 
would be included in the 'per person' bodily 
injury limits, that there would be no separate 
claim above and beyond those limits for loss 
of consortium, and that a separate limit would 
apply only in those states where the law 
requires a separate limit. That plain 
intention must be recognized and given force. 
962 P.2d at 635. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals has determined the language in 
the same Farmers policy to be unambiguous in the underinsured 
coverage context. In Campbell v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona, 
745 P.2d 160 (Ariz. App. 1987), the Court found (in the 
underinsured coverage context) that a loss of consortium claim is 
not "bodily injury" and that such a claim is encompassed within the 
"each person" limit of the Farmers policy. 743 P.2d at 166. The 
Court held that its analysis of the "per person" issue was the same 
whether in the context of the liability provisions or of the 
uninsured provisions of the Farmers policy. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals (again interpreting the relevant 
policy language at issue in the present case) stated 
We are persuaded and hold that the pertinent 
language of Farmers' automobile policy is 
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unambiguous, that coverage under Farmers 
automobile policy for (the loss of consortium 
claims) is subject to the policy's . . . per 
person liability limit applicable to (the 
injured person's) claim . . . . 
Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Rosen by Rosen, 839 P.2d 71 at 75 
(Kan. App. 1992). 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. 
Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820 (Wyo. 2000), an uninsured motorist case, 
interpreted the Farmers language to mean the per person limitation 
applies to loss of consortium claims. 
The Montana court in Bain v. Gleason, 726 P. 2d 1153 (Mont. 
1986), determined that a loss of consortium claim is a separate 
cause of action, and determined that the Farmers language at issue 
clearly provided for only one liability limit. The statutory 
financial responsibility language in Montana, as quoted in Bain, is 
nearly identical to that of Utah. Similarly, under South Carolina 
law, where loss of consortium is an independent action and not 
derivative, the court interpreted the language in another insurer's 
policy and held: 
The crux of coverage is not the separateness 
of a loss of consortium claim. Instead, the 
key is the consequential or direct nature of 
the damages sought. Where the claim is for 
consequential damages resulting from the 
bodily injuries suffered by the other spouse, 
rather than direct emotional or physical 
injury inflicted by the tort feasor, the 
damage claim is covered by the single "per 
person" limit applicable to the claim for 
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bodily injury giving rise to the consequential 
damages. Wife's damages are consequential and 
are covered under the same "per person" limit 
as the bodily injuries of husband. 
Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 341 S.C. 
143, 533 S.E.2d 597, 604 (2000). 
What all of these cases make plain is that where an insurer 
clearly includes a loss of consortium claim within the per person 
limit for bodily injury, that language will be enforced as written. 
Such Mid Century Insurance Company policy language was enforced in 
Montgomery v. Farmers Insurance Group, Mid Century Insurance 
Company, 585 F. Supp. 618 at 619 (S.D. Ind. 1984) : 
In this instance only one person sustained 
bodily injury. While two persons assert 
claims for damages, the claim of the second is 
for loss of consortium arising from the bodily 
injury of the first. (The non-physically 
injured spouse's) claim is part of the 
"damages arising out of bodily injury 
sustained by one person in any one occurrence" 
and therefore is encompassed within the 
$25,000.00 limit. The $50,000.00 limit could 
apply only if (the non-physically injured 
spouse) had sustained bodily injuries. 
The Court of Appeals of Arkansas reached the same result when 
interpreting the same Farmers policy language. That is, the Mid 
Century per person limit applied to a loss of consortium claim 
since the policy so provided. Sweeden v. Farmers Insurance Group, 
71 Ark. App. 381, 30 S.W.3d 783 (2000). 
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The Oregon court in a case involving policy language from an 
insurance policy with similar language and a statutory scheme with 
similar language, Teply v. Ballard, 922 P.2d 1236 (Or. App. 1996), 
ruled that a single limit applies to a loss of consortium claim. 
The court held that Oregon's Financial Responsibility Law did not 
require a minimum limit of coverage for loss of consortium 
independent of the bodily injury liability limit. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Farmers 
to Mr. Versaw clearly and unambiguously includes coverage for Mr. 
Versaw when a claim is made against him for loss of consortium. 
The policy language provides that a claim for loss of consortium is 
included within the one person limit provided for in his policy. 
In Mr. Versaw's case, he paid for $30,000 per person limits. 
Because the Farmers policy complies with Utah law and is clear and 
unambiguous, it should be enforced as written. It should be 
enforced as it has been enforced by every court which has 
interpreted the Farmers policy at issue here. That is, loss of 
consortium, which is a claim for loss of relationship separate and 
distinct from a claim for bodily injury, is subject to the one 
person limit of the policy. Thus, the total liability coverage 
available to Mr. Versaw for the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Viera is 
$30,000.00. 
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